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1.   Introduction  
What  does  epistemic  rationality  require  of  us  in  the  face  of  moral  disagreement?  
In  many  cases,  it’s  natural  to  suppose  that  a  rational  person  would  be  steadfast  in  
her  contested  moral  judgments:  she  would  not  lose  much  confidence  on  account  
of  disagreement.  To  make  this  vivid,  consider:  
Homosexuality           I   judge   that   homosexuality   is   morally   permissible.  
However,  I  also  believe  that  an  enormous  number  of  people,  now  and  
throughout  history,  disagree  with  me:  they  judge  that  homosexuality  
is  morally  impermissible.  Moreover,  I  believe  that  my  disagreement  
with  a  great  many  of   these  people  does  not  rest  on  a  disagreement  
over  non-­‐moral  facts.  
It  is  plausible  that,  in  cases  like  Homosexuality,  I  am  not  epistemically  required  to  
significantly   reduce  confidence   in  my  contested  moral  belief.  To   the  contrary,   I  
appear  permitted  –  or  perhaps  even  required  –  to  remain  steadfast   in  my  moral  
judgment  even  in  the  face  of  overwhelmingly  opposed  opinion.      
This  sort  of  steadfastness  does  not  seem  nearly  as  respectable  when  it  comes  to  
paradigmatic  non-­‐moral  disagreements,  like  the  following:  
Mental  Math   My  friends  and  I,  attempting  to  calculate  an  18%  tip  on  a  
bill  of  $45,  all  separately  do  some  mental  math.  I  conclude  that  an  18%  
tip   is  $8.10.   I   then   learn   that  many  of  my   friends  disagree  with  me;  
based  on  the  mental  math  they  have  performed,  they  believe  that,  in  
our  case,  an  18%  tip  is  $8.20.2  
In  this  case,  it’s  much  less  plausible  that  I  am  permitted  to  be  steadfast  in  my  belief.  
Rather,  I  seem  required  to  conciliate:  to  become  less  confident  in  my  belief  that  
the  18%  tip  is  $8.10,  and  perhaps  even  to  abandon  it  (at  least  until  I  can  confirm  it).  
Suppose  that  these  cases  are  as  they  seem:  steadfastness   is   indeed  epistemically  
appropriate  in  Homosexuality,  while  conciliation  is  appropriate  in  Mental  Math.  
What  could  explain  this  profound  difference?  Because  the  two  cases  differ  in  many  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  The  co-­‐authors  contributed  equally  to  the  paper.  For  helpful  discussion,  we  thank  the  editors  of  this  
volume,  Justin  D’Arms,  David  Faraci,  David  Plunkett,  and  an  audience  at  the  Ohio  State  University.  
2  This  example  is  adapted  from  Christensen  (2007,  193).  Cf.  Christensen  (2009,  757).  
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respects,  it’s  no  simple  matter  to  say  just  which  difference  would  justify  responding  
to  them  so  differently.  However,  some  salient  differences  between  the  cases  do  not  
seem  apt  to  explain  the  epistemic  contrast  between  them.  Consider  two  examples.  
First,  many  of  us  are  more  confident  in  our  beliefs  about  the  moral  significance  of  
homosexuality   than   in   the  results  of  our  mental  mathematical  calculations.  But  
even   if   we   stipulate   that   I   am   extremely   confident   in   the   Mental   Math   case,  
conciliation  seems  appropriate.  Second,  Homosexuality  concerns  a  disagreement  
that  has  profound  implications  about  how  people  ought  to  act,  while  Mental  Math  
does   not.   But   we   can   easily   imagine   a   variant   on  mental   math   with   profound  
implications.  For  example,  suppose  that  rather  than  attempting  to  determine  a  fair  
tip,  we  are  using  the  same  calculation  to  determine  the  code  that  will  deactivate  a  
dirty  bomb  which  will  otherwise  detonate  and  kill  thousands.  If  I  conclude  that  
the  code  is  8.10,  while  many  of  my  friends  conclude  that  the  code  is  8.20,  this  seems  
to  call  for  conciliation.  
There   is  an   interesting  puzzle,   then,  about   just  which   feature  of  Homosexuality  
makes   steadfastness   epistemically   appropriate.  Whatever   feature   it   is,   however,  
seems   to   be   shared   by  many   cases   of  moral   disagreement.   Steadfastness   seems  
appropriate,  for  instance,  for  a  defender  of  the  moral  rights  of  women  who  notes  
disagreement  from  a  broadly  sexist  world  community.  Perhaps  the  same  goes  for  
disagreements  about  topics  ranging  from  abortion  to  the  death  penalty.3  It’s  much  
less   obvious   that   anything   like   this   general   trend   holds   of   non-­‐moral  
disagreements—even  ones   that  otherwise   resemble  cases   like  Homosexuality  as  
much  as  possible.  
These  observations  suggest  the  following  general  claim:    
Asymmetry            Epistemic   rationality   often   requires   (or   permits)   a  more  
steadfast   response   to   pure   moral   disagreement   than   it   does   to  
otherwise  analogous  non-­‐moral  disagreement  
It   is   worth   emphasizing   that   Asymmetry   is   a   claim   about   pure   moral  
disagreement.4  A  disagreement  over  a  moral  claim,  p,  is  a  pure  moral  disagreement  
just  in  case  the  parties  to  the  disagreement  do  not  disagree  about  p  even  partly  in  
virtue  of  disagreeing  about  some  non-­‐moral  claim.  Contrast  cases  where  our  moral  
disagreement  is  wholly  based  in  underlying  non-­‐moral  disagreement.  Suppose  for  
instance,   that  we   disagree   about  whether  we   should   imprison   Scarlet,   but  only  
because  we  disagree  about  some  non-­‐moral  facts,  such  as  whether  she  killed  Mr.  
Body   with   the   lead   pipe.   Other   things   being   equal,   to   the   extent   that   it   is  
epistemically  rational  to  become  less  confident  that  Scarlet  wielded  the  pipe,  it  is  
also  epistemically  rational  to  become  less  confident  that  we  should  imprison  her.  
(Between   these   extremes   lie  mixed   cases  of  disagreements  based  partly   in  pure  
moral  disagreements  and  partly  in  non-­‐moral  disagreements.  We  set  these  cases  
aside  here,  although  a  view  in  the  spirit  of  Asymmetry  suggests  that  we  often  will  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Kalderon  (2005,  34-­‐5)  makes  a  closely  related  point  focusing  on  disagreements  about  the  morality  
of  abortion.  
4  Note,  also,  that  Asymmetry  is  a  thesis  about  moral  judgments.  Though  a  parallel  thesis  about  certain  
other   sorts   of   normative   judgment  may   be   plausible,   we   doubt   that   it   generalizes   to   normative  
judgments  generally.  Consider  judgments  about  purely  social  norms:  epistemic  rationality  does  not  
seem  to  require  or  permit  a  remarkable  degree  of  steadfastness  in  disagreements  about  politeness.  
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be  required  to  conciliate  somewhat  in  such  cases  in  light  of  the  underlying  non-­‐
moral  disagreement.)  
Our  brief  discussion  thus  far   is   intended  to  bring  out  the  appeal  of  Asymmetry.  
That  said,  in  this  paper  we  neither  endorse  nor  aim  to  defend  Asymmetry.  Rather,  
given  its  initial  plausibility,  we  grant  its  truth  for  the  sake  of  argument,  in  order  to  
examine  its  potential  metaethical  implications.  Some  philosophers  have  claimed  
that   anti-­‐realists   –   but   not   realists   –   can   offer   a   natural   account   of   the   sort   of  
contrast   that  Asymmetry  posits  between  the  epistemically   rational   responses   to  
moral  and  non-­‐moral  disagreement.5  If  this  were  correct,  the  truth  of  Asymmetry  
would  be  important  potential  evidence  for  metaethical  anti-­‐realism.    
Before  motivating  these  alleged  anti-­‐realist  implications,  we  will  explain  what  we  
mean  by  “realism”  and  “anti-­‐realism”  in  the  metaethical  context.  We  understand  
moral   realism   as   a   family   of   views   characterized   by   three   commitments.6   First,  
consider  ordinary  declarative  sentences  which  include  moral  words,  such  as  “It  is  
wrong  to  eat  meat,”  and  parallel  moral  thoughts,  such  as  the  belief  that  it  is  wrong  
to  eat  meat.  The  first  realist  commitment  is  descriptivism:  that  such  sentences  and  
thoughts  represent  the  world  as  being  a  certain  way.  Descriptivism  contrasts  with  
views  on  which  moral  words  mark  distinctive  speech-­‐acts  or  semantically  express  
non-­‐belief-­‐like  psychological  states.  Second,  some  words,  like  “here”  and  “illegal,”  
are   context-­‐sensitive.   Interpreting   sentences   containing   these   words   ordinarily  
requires  filling  in  certain  information  from  the  context  of  utterance,  such  as  the  
place  of  utterance  or  the  intended  legal  system.  The  second  realist  commitment  is  
invariantism:  the  denial  that  moral  words  are  context-­‐sensitive.7  The  third  realist  
commitment   is  representational  success:   the  realist   insists   (against  certain  error  
theorists)  that  moral  terms  have  non-­‐empty  extensions.  For  example,  the  realist  
will  insist  that  some  acts  are  wrong.8    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Compare  Kalderon  (2005)  and  McGrath  (2011).  Kalderon’s  thesis  differs   from  Asymmetry;  on  his  
view,  the  distinctive  feature  of  pure  moral  disagreements  is  that  they  do  not  place  disputants  under  
a  “lax  obligation”  to  perform  further  inquiry  (2005,  35).  McGrath’s  datum  concerns  moral  deference  
rather  than  moral  disagreement  (for  a  discussion  of  the  contrasts  between  these  issues,  see  Fritz  ms.).  
However,   despite   these   different   characterizations   of   the   datum,   both   Kalderon   and   McGrath  
endorse  something  akin  to  the  Simple  Diagnosis,  introduced  below.    
6   The   term   “moral   realism”   is   used   in  many  ways.  Our   intent  here   is   not   to   legislate   use,   but   to  
explicitly  state  a  familiar  distinction  the  term  is  used  to  pick  out,  which  is  relevant  to  the  project  of  
this  paper.  
7  The  text  simplifies  in  two  ways,  for  brevity.  First,  it  ignores  the  contrast  between  contextualist  and  
relativist  views  here,  which  concerns,  roughly,  whether  semantic  contents  or  only  truth-­‐conditions  
vary  with  context.  Second,  a  more  plausible  realistic  view  grants  that  the  ordinary  words  typically  
used   to  make  moral   claims   (“good”,   “wrong”,   “ought”,   etc.)   are   context-­‐sensitive,   usable   to  make  
claims  about  non-­‐moral  norms,  the  prevailing  moral  beliefs  in  a  community,  etc.  This  more  plausible  
realistic  view  nevertheless  insists  that  there  is  a  wide  range  of  both  ordinary  and  theoretical  contexts  
–  the  contexts  of  moral  thought  and  talk  strictly  speaking  –  in  which  there  is  a  single  invariant  content  
associated  with  each  of  these  words.    
8  In  the  following  discussion  of  Asymmetry,  we  set  aside  moral  error  theory  because  it  is  not  clear  
that   the  moral   error   theorist  has   any   attractive   tools   for   explaining  Asymmetry   that   are  not   also  
available  to  the  realist.    We  set  aside  another  anti-­‐realist  view,  hermeneutic  fictionalism  about  moral  
discourse,  for  a  different  reason.  Fictionalism  can  be  developed  in  many  ways,  and  the  contrast  with  
realism  will  look  different  on  different  versions  of  the  view.  (However,  the  arguments  of  §§2-­‐3  will  
be  relevant  for  many  versions  of  hermeneutic  fictionalism.)	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This  brief  gloss  puts  us  in  a  position  to  show  why  Asymmetry  might  appear  to  favor  
anti-­‐realism.  In  non-­‐moral  cases  like  Mental  Math,  the  requirement  to  conciliate  
arises   in   part   because   the   disagreement   at   hand   provides   evidence   of   one’s  
potential  unreliability  about  an  objective  mathematical   fact.9  But  on  anti-­‐realist  
views  about  moral   thought  and   talk,  pure  moral  disagreements  do  not   concern  
objective  moral  facts.  Such  disagreement  thus  could  not  provide  evidence  of  one’s  
potential  unreliability  about  such  facts.  The  anti-­‐realist  can  thus  offer  what  we  call  
the   Simple   Diagnosis   of   Asymmetry:   given   the   truth   of   anti-­‐realism,   moral  
disagreements  do  not  provide  evidence  of  unreliability  about  objective  moral  facts,  
and   this  distinctive   fact  about  moral  disagreements  explains  why  Asymmetry   is  
true.  If  the  Simple  Diagnosis  withstands  scrutiny,  and  the  realist  cannot  provide  as  
elegant  an  explanation,  antirealism  is  in  this  respect  more  plausible.10  
This  paper  argues  against  the  Simple  Diagnosis.  Sections  2  and  3   illustrate  that,  
when  it  comes  to  anti-­‐descriptivism  and  (anti-­‐realist)  contextualism  respectively,  
adopting  an  anti-­‐realist  position  does  not  help  the  metaethical  theorist  to  offer  a  
plausible  explanation  of  Asymmetry.  We  show  that,  while  the  simplest  forms  of  
these  views  do  in  fact  offer  straightforward  explanations  of  Asymmetry,  such  forms  
of   these  views  are   independently  highly   implausible.  We   then   show   that,  when  
these   views   are   developed   in   ways   that  make   them  more   credible,   they   fail   to  
straightforwardly   vindicate  Asymmetry.   In  Section  4,  we   suggest   an  alternative,  
potentially  attractive  explanation  for  Asymmetry—one  which  appeals  to  the  moral  
importance  of  steadfastness  in  moral  disagreement.  We  note  that  this  explanation  
raises   important  metaethical   questions,   but   does   not   obviously   favor   the   anti-­‐
realist  over  the  realist.  
  
2.   Anti-­‐Descriptivism  and  Asymmetry  
This   section   considers   whether   the   anti-­‐descriptivist   can   smoothly   explain  
Asymmetry.  We  begin  by  considering  the  simplest  sort  of  anti-­‐descriptivist  theory.  
We   show   that,   although   this   sort   of   theory   may   offer   an   easy   vindication   of  
Asymmetry,  its  very  simplicity  renders  it  implausible.  We  then  consider  ways  that  
anti-­‐descriptivist   theories  can  be  made  more  sophisticated  and  plausible.  These  
sophistications,   we   argue,   rob   anti-­‐descriptivism   of   its   ability   to   explain  
Asymmetry  in  a  distinctive  way.  
To   begin,   consider   a   crude   form   of   non-­‐cognitivist   anti-­‐descriptivism.   On   this  
view,  the  mental  state  of  judging  that  it  is  morally  wrong  to  do  A  is  just  the  state  
of  having  a  certain  negatively-­‐valenced  phenomenal  feeling  towards  doing  A.11  On  
such  a  view,  it  is  initially  very  plausible  that  I  am  epistemically  permitted  to  remain  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  On  a  variety  of  views  about  the  epistemic  role  of  disagreement,  disagreement  calls  for  belief  revision  
precisely  by  providing  evidence  of  unreliability.  See,  e.g.,  Christensen  (2009,  757)  and  Kelly  (2010,  
138-­‐9).  
10  Compare  the  very  similar  reasoning  in  McGrath  (2011,  116-­‐7).  Kalderon  (2005,  Ch.1)  argues  for  the  
stronger  thesis  that  realism  is  incompatible  with  (something  very  like)  Asymmetry.      
11  For  a  view  that  is  nearly  but  not  quite  this  crude,  see  (Ayer  1946).  We  offer  “a  certain  negatively-­‐
valenced   phenomenal   feeling”   here   as   a   placeholder   for   a   plausible   specification   of   the   relevant  
attitude.  For  discussion  of  this  problem  see  (Miller  2013,  §3.6)  and  (Björnsson  and  McPherson  2014).  
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steadfast  in  my  moral  judgment  in  the  face  of  disagreement.  This  is  simply  because  
there   are   few   if   any   epistemic   constraints   on   bare   phenomenal   feelings.12   This  
appears   to   provide   the   crude   non-­‐cognitivist   with   a   simple   explanation   of  
Asymmetry.    
There  are  at  least  two  reasons  to  be  dissatisfied  by  this  explanation.  First,  even  if  it  
is  compatible  with  the  letter  of  Asymmetry,  it  fits  uneasily  with  its  spirit.  Most  who  
consider   steadfastness   an   appropriate   response   to   disagreements   like  
Homosexuality   will   not   consider   every   sort   of   reaction   to   such   disagreements  
epistemically  acceptable.  For  example,  other  things  being  equal,  it  seems  irrational  
to   become  much  more   confident   in   a  moral   judgment   upon   learning   that   it   is  
subject  to  widespread  disagreement.  But  crude  non-­‐cognitivism  suggests  that  this  
transition  –  being  a  mere  change  in  phenomenal  feelings  –  is  not  apt  for  epistemic  
assessment.    
This  is  an  instance  of  a  second  and  broader  problem:  the  crude  non-­‐cognitivism  
just   sketched   fails   to   provide   a   satisfying   account   of   moral   judgment   quite  
generally.   Anti-­‐descriptivism   is   intended   as   a   hermeneutic   thesis   about   moral  
thought.   And   this  means   that   the   anti-­‐descriptivist   faces   pressure   to   vindicate  
certain  further  appearances  about  moral  thought  and  talk  (or  at  least  demonstrate  
compatibility  with   them).   For   example,   anti-­‐descriptivism   should   vindicate   the  
idea  that  certain  sets  of  moral   judgments  are   inconsistent,13  and  that  possessing  
such  an  inconsistent  set  of  judgments  is  (perhaps  other  things  equal)  epistemically  
irrational.14  Consider,  for  example,  the  pair  of  judgments:  Kissing  is  wrong;  kissing  
is  not  wrong.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  crude  non-­‐cognitivism  sketched  above  can  
explain  the  irrationality  of  simultaneously  accepting  such  a  pair  of  judgments.    
Suppose  that  the  anti-­‐descriptivist  is  able  to  refine  her  view  so  that  it  can  explain  
such  epistemic  constraints  on  moral  judgments.  The  first  thing  to  note  is  that  she  
can  no  longer  explain  Asymmetry  in  the  way  that  the  crude  non-­‐cognitivist  did.  
Instead  of  appealing  to  a  general  lack  of  epistemic  constraints  on  moral  thought,  
the  anti-­‐descriptivist  must   show   that  her  view  generates   some   such  constraints  
(such  as  consistency)  but  not  others  (conciliation  in  the  face  of  disagreement).  We  
now  suggest  strong  reasons  to  doubt  that  the  anti-­‐descriptivist  can  accomplish  this  
goal.    
In   order   to   provide   a   plausible   hermeneutic   theory,   anti-­‐descriptivism  must   be  
able  to  accommodate  the   intelligibility  of  commonplace  thoughts  of  the  form:  I  
am  not  morally  infallible.  Given  Asymmetry’s  focus  on  pure  moral  disagreement,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12   Many   philosophers   take   certain   emotions   to   have   distinctive   fittingness   conditions,   and  
representational,  or  quasi-­‐representational  contents  (see  DeSousa  2014,  §5-­‐6  for  discussion).  Non-­‐
cognitivist   views   that   identify  moral   judgments   with   such   states   will   potentially   have   additional  
resources  to  vindicate  epistemic  constraints  on  moral  judgments.  We  set  this  interesting  dimension  
of  the  problem  aside  here.    
13  Offering  a  general  account  of  inconsistency  in  moral  thought  is  a  non-­‐trivial  challenge  for  the  non-­‐
cognitivist,  intimately  connected  to  the  Frege-­‐Geach  problem  (cf.  Gibbard  2003;  Schroeder  2008).  
14  This  caveat  is  intended  to  leave  open  the  possibility  that  in  certain  real-­‐life  cases,  retaining  all  of  
an  inconsistent  set  of  beliefs  could  be  the  most  rational  option  for  an  agent.  Compare  (Harman  1983).  
Note  that  part  of  the  task  here  is  to  explain  how  epistemic  norms  can  apply  to  non-­‐cognitive  states  
at  all.      
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we  focus  on  fallibility  concerning  purely  moral  matters.  One  way  to  model  such  
fallibility  judgments  begins  with  the  observation  that  one  could  be  better  informed  
about  certain  arguments  and  ideas,  more  imaginative  when  considering  unobvious  
alternatives,   and  more   coherent   in   one’s   beliefs.   In   short,   one’s  moral   thinking  
could  be  more  procedurally  ideal.  Now  suppose  that  UIf’s  view  about  purely  moral  
matters  is  utilitarian.  We  might  interpret  Ulf’s  thought  that  this  view  is  fallible  as  
involving:  (a)  a  belief  that  he  might  reject  the  utilitarian  principle  upon  becoming  
more  procedurally   ideal,  and  (b)  a  higher-­‐order  attitude,  endorsing  abandoning  
the  utilitarian  principle,  were  he  to  come  to  believe  that  he  would  abandon  it  if  he  
were  more  procedurally  ideal  (cf.  Blackburn  1998,  318).  
While   this   model   makes   some   progress,   it   fails   to   explain   the   full   range   of  
reasonable   fallibility   judgments.   For   many   of   us   think   that   someone   could   be  
procedurally  ideal,  but  nonetheless  flat-­‐out  wrong  about  a  purely  moral  matter.  If  
I   accept   this   general   view,   appropriate   humility   arguably   requires   me   to  
acknowledge  that  it  applies  to  me:  that  I  might  be  such  that,  even  were  I  to  become  
procedurally   ideal,   I   might   nonetheless   be   mistaken   about   some   purely   moral  
matter.  The  crucial  issue  here  is  not  whether  this  thought  is  correct.  Rather,  the  
issue  is  that  it  is  manifestly  a  thought  that  a  reasonable  person  might  have.  The  
challenge   for   the   anti-­‐descriptivist   is   to   explain   what   this   thought   could   even  
amount  to.  It  is  controversial  whether  the  anti-­‐descriptivist  can  offer  an  adequate  
explanation  here  (Egan  2007,  Köhler  2015).  However,  because  the  thought  seems  
so  natural,  the  ability  to  explain  what  it  consists  in  seems  very  important  to  the  
credibility  of  anti-­‐descriptivism  as  an  interpretation  of  our  actual  thought  and  talk.    
Why   is   this   important?  Briefly,  because  once   the  anti-­‐descriptivist  explains   this  
sort  of  thought,  the  Simple  Diagnosis  of  Asymmetry  suggested  above  is  no  longer  
available  to  her.  If  it  is  possible  to  be  flat-­‐out  wrong  about  a  purely  moral  matter,  
then   it   seems  that  disagreement  could  provide  evidence   that   I  might   indeed  be  
mistaken  here,  just  as  it  can  in  cases  like  Mental  Math.  It  is  true  that  a  plausible  
anti-­‐descriptivism  must   seek   to   explain   the   thought   that   I   might   be   mistaken  
without  invoking  moral  reality.  But  conciliation  can  be  motivated  by  the  thought  
that  disagreement  is  evidence  that  I  might  be  mistaken,  so  it  is  not  clear  what  talk  
of  reality  adds  to  this  sort  of  motivation.    
The   clear   contrast   that   underpins   the   Simple   Diagnosis   of   Asymmetry   thus  
collapses   once   we   consider   relevantly   plausible   versions   of   anti-­‐descriptivism.15  
Although   an   implausibly   simple   anti-­‐descriptivism   could   easily   explain   why  
Asymmetry  is  true,  the  path  from  a  plausible  anti-­‐descriptivism  to  Asymmetry  is  
far  from  obvious.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Similar  points  hold  for  Kalderon’s  Asymmetry-­‐like  thesis  mentioned  in  n.6  above.  According  to  
Kalderon,  in  cases  like  Mental  Math  but  not  cases  like  Homosexuality,  one  is  under  a  lax  procedural  
obligation  to  inquire  further.  But  plausible  forms  of  anti-­‐descriptivism  appear  compatible  with  the  
idea   that   the   disagreement   in   Homosexuality   is   explained   by   the   fact   that   one   of   the   parties   is  
imperfectly   informed  or   just   flat-­‐out  wrong.  Appropriate  humility   suggests   that   it  might  be  your  
moral  views  that  could  be  improved.  In  light  of  this,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  plausible  forms  of  anti-­‐
descriptivism  can  explain  Kalderon’s  datum.    
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3.   Contextualism  and  Asymmetry  
In  this  section,  we  consider  a  strategy  by  which  contextualist  anti-­‐realists  might  
attempt   to   vindicate   Asymmetry.   Roughly,   the   strategy   is   to   claim   that   typical  
disputants   in  a  pure  moral  disagreement  are   talking  or   thinking  about  different  
subject  matters.  This  strategy,  we  argue,  faces  a  problem  very  similar  to  the  one  
just  noted  for  the  anti-­‐descriptivist.  Although  certain  simple  contextualist  views  
can   easily   vindicate   Asymmetry   in   this   way,   they   do   so   at   the   cost   of   being  
independently   implausible.   And,   as   contextualist   views   become   more  
sophisticated  and  plausible,   they   frequently   lose   the  ability   to   straightforwardly  
vindicate   Asymmetry.16   We   illustrate   this   point   by   briefly   considering   two  
influential  ways  of  making  contextualist  views  more  sophisticated.    
Consider  a  view   that   sometimes  goes  by   the  name  “simple   subjectivism:”  moral  
judgments  are  simply  beliefs  about  certain  of  one’s  own  attitudes,  and  the  content  
of   a  moral   sentence   is   a   proposition   reporting   the   attitudes   of   the   person  who  
utters  it.  On  this  view,  when  I  say  “homosexuality  is  morally  permissible,”  I  simply  
assert   that   I   have   a   certain   positive   attitude   or   cluster   of   attitudes   towards  
homosexuality.  On  our  usage,  this  is  a  form  of  metaethical  contextualism,  because  
interpreting   the   sentence   “homosexuality   is   morally   permissible”   will   require  
information  from  the  context  of  utterance:  specifically,  which  person  has  uttered  
the  sentence.  
This  view  suggests  that  people  in  cases  of  pure  moral  disagreement  are  concerned  
with   different   subject   matters;   they   are   talking   past   (or,   in   cases   of   unspoken  
disagreement,   thinking   past)   one   another.   This   seems   to   justify   steadfastness.  
Epistemic  rationality  should  not  require  that  I  revise  beliefs  about  which  attitudes  
I  currently  have  in  light  of  evidence  that  other  people  have  different  attitudes.  Thus,  
if  pure  moral  disagreement  typically  involves  this  sort  of  thinking-­‐past,  while  non-­‐
moral   disagreements   typically   do   not,   this   would   provide   a   straightforward  
explanation  of  Asymmetry.  
Notice,   however,   that   the   very   feature   that   allows   the   simple   contextualist   to  
explain  Asymmetry   is   independently   implausible:  parties   to  paradigmatic  moral  
disagreement  do  not  appear  to  be  simply  talking  past  one  another.  They  usually  
seem  to  be  genuinely  disagreeing;  paradigmatic  cases  of  talking  or  thinking  past,  
by  contrast,  do  not   involve  genuine  disagreement.  In   light  of  this,  any  plausible  
version  of  contextualist  anti-­‐realism  must  amend  the  simple  account  just  given,  in  
order  to  explain  how  pure  moral  disagreement  can  be  genuine.  We  consider  two  
of   the   most   initially   promising   such   amendments   below.   In   each   case,   the  
proposed   amendment   both   helps   contextualists   to   explain   why   pure   moral  
disagreements   are   genuine   and   makes   it   harder   for   them   to   explain   why  
Asymmetry  is  true.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16   Something   very   much   like   the   contextualist   strategy   is   also   available   to   relativist   views   (see  
MacFarlane  2014).  For  reasons  of  space,  we  limit  our  discussion  to  contextualism,  but  relativist  views  
face  the  same  problem  as  contextualist  ones:  they  cannot  plausibly  explain  the  genuineness  of  pure  
moral  disagreement  while  retaining  the  simple  “talking-­‐past”  vindication  of  Asymmetry.  For  further  
discussion,  see  Dreier  (2009)  and  Carter  (2014).  
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James   Dreier   (1990)   offers   a   contextualist   view   that   makes   use   of   an   analogy  
between  moral   terms   and   paradigmatic   context-­‐sensitive   terms   like   “here”   and  
“nearby.”  It  would  be  far  too  simple,  Dreier  notes,  to  suggest  that  “nearby”  always  
picks  out  locations  close  to  the  speaker;  in  certain  embeddings,  “nearby”  picks  out  
locations   close   to   some  other   contextually   salient  position   (1990,   23).   Similarly,  
Dreier  argues,  we  should  not  think  that  a  sentence  like  “murder  is  morally  wrong”  
always   simply   reports   on   the   speaker’s   attitudes   toward   murder.   On   a   more  
plausible  contextualist  account  of   “morally  wrong,”   the  term’s  semantic  value   is  
determined  in  part  by  whichever  “moral  system”  is  the  best  candidate  within  the  
context  of  utterance  (1990,  24).  And,  according  to  Dreier,  the  best  candidate  moral  
system  is  not  always  the  one  most  closely  associated  with  the  speaker’s  attitudes.  
Therefore,  a  claim  like  “murder  is  wrong”  may  be  relativized  to  a  moral  system  that  
the  speaker  does  not  endorse—including,  in  some  cases,  the  moral  system  most  
nearly  endorsed  by  her  society  at  large  (1990,  22).  
Although  Dreier’s  primary  goal  is  not  to  explain  how  pure  moral  disagreement  can  
be   genuine,   his   account   suggests   one   such   explanation.   Perhaps   moral  
disagreement   is   genuine   precisely   when   two   moral   thinkers’   judgments   are  
relativized   to   the  same  moral   system.  On  Dreier’s   theory,   this  condition  can  be  
met  even  when  disputants’  actual  attitudes  diverge  substantially.  If,  for  instance,  
the  best  candidate  moral  system  in  a  context  is  very  often  the  moral  system  most  
prevalent   in   the   conversational   participants’   society,   a   great   many   moral  
disagreements  will  be  genuine.17  
This  vindication  of  genuine  pure  moral  disagreement  threatens  the  contextualist’s  
ability  to  explain  Asymmetry,  however.  Consider  any  case  in  which  Dreier’s  view  
vindicates   the   existence  of   genuine  moral  disagreement.  The   view  does   that  by  
suggesting  that  –  in  that  context  –  the  parties  to  the  dispute  are  disputing  the  same  
(contextually   fixed)  subject  matter.  But   if   this   is   the  case,  a  disputant   in  such  a  
context  might  be  epistemically  required  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  that  
her  opponents  are  more  accurately  representing  this  shared  subject  matter.  But  it  
was  precisely  the  mismatch  in  subject  matter  that  allowed  the  simple  contextualist  
to   vindicate   Asymmetry.   In   short,   while   the   claim   that   context   frequently  
determines  a  common  topic  for  pure  moral  disagreement  can  neatly  explain  the  
genuineness   of   that   disagreement,   it   also   destroys   the   simple   contextualist’s  
explanation  of  Asymmetry  for  all  such  cases.  
Consider   a   second   way   that   the   contextualist   might   model   pure   moral  
disagreement.   To   begin,   notice   that   utterance   of   some   context-­‐sensitive  
expressions  can  simultaneously  bear  both  of  two  very  different  relationships  to  the  
contextually  relevant  standard  for  those  expressions.  Consider  an  example.  On  the  
one   hand,   when   I   utter   “Jane   is   tall,”   whether   this   sentence   is   true   is   partly   a  
function   of   the   contextually   relevant   standard   for   tallness.  On   the   other   hand,  
utterances  like  this  –  especially  if  they  are  accepted  by  conversational  participants  
–   can   function   to  determine  which   standard   of   tallness   is   contextually   relevant  
(Barker   2002).   However,   other   conversational   participants   can   challenge   such  
attempts   to   amend   the   contextually   relevant   standard.   For   example,   you  might  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Dreier  leaves  open  this  possibility  (1990,  22).  
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resist  my  attempt  to  modify  the  standard  for  ‘tall’  by  saying  “Nope.  Jane  is  definitely  
not  tall.”    
David   Plunkett   and   Tim   Sundell   (2013,   3)   dub   such   cases   instances   of  
metalinguistic  negotiation:  what  is  at  issue  in  the  dispute  between  us  is  whether  to  
admit   a   sharpening   of   the   extension   of   “tall”   that   includes   Jane.   A  metaethical  
contextualist   who   accepts   this   view   can   thereby   argue   that   an   exchange   like  
“Kissing   is   wrong”/   “No,   kissing   is   not   wrong”   involves   opposing   attempts   to  
“pragmatically   advocate”   (2013,   17)   for   certain   sharpenings   of   the   contextually  
relevant  moral  standard.  By  asserting  “Kissing  is  wrong,”  a  speaker  can  advocate  
for   use   of   the   term   “wrong”   in   such   a  way   that   it   applies   to   the   act   of   kissing.  
Likewise,  by  asserting  “Kissing  is  not  wrong,”  another  speaker  can  advocate  for  use  
of  the  term  “wrong”  in  such  a  way  that  it  does  not  apply  to  kissing.  Plunkett  and  
Sundell  argue  that,  even  if  disagreements  of  this  sort  do  not  involve  any  contrary  
beliefs  about   the   facts  about   the  act  of  kissing,   there   is  nevertheless  an  entirely  
recognizable   sense   in   which   they   are   genuine   disagreements.   They   are  
disagreements  in  conceptual  ethics.18  
Metalinguistic  negotiation,   then,  provides  an  attractive  tool   to  the  contextualist  
who   wants   to   explain   how   pure   moral   disagreements   can   be   genuine  
disagreements.  But  it’s  far  from  clear  that  the  contextualist  who  uses  this  tool  can  
easily  vindicate  Asymmetry.  To  see   this,   suppose   for   simplicity’s   sake   that   truly  
pure  moral  disagreements  are  genuine  disagreements  only  in  the  sense  that  they  
involve  disagreements  about  how  to  use  moral  terms  or  concepts.19  And  suppose  
that  I  use  the  standard  WRONGA  in  making  judgments  about  moral  wrongness.  I  
then  learn  that  almost  every  moral  thinker  whom  I  respect  considers  WRONGA  
seriously  flawed  and  instead  uses  a  different  standard,  WRONGB.  Learning  about  
this   disagreement   seems   to   put   me   under   rational   pressure   to   become   less  
confident   that   I   should   use   WRONGA   and   more   confident   that   I   should   use  
WRONGB.  Next  consider  any  moral  sentence  that  is  true  when  “wrong”  gets  the  
content  WRONGA  but  false  when  “wrong”  gets  the  content  WRONGB.  It  seems  that  
the  disagreement  should  make  me  more  hesitant  to  assent  to  that  sentence,  and  
to   token   it   in   my   moral   reasoning.   In   short,   even   though   I   begin   such   a  
disagreement   by   “thinking   past”   most   other   moral   thinkers,   rationality   might  
require  me  to  stop  thinking  past  them.  But  once  I  do  stop  thinking  past  them,  their  
disagreement   can   provide   evidence   that   I   might   be   unreliable   about   the   (now  
shared)  topic,  and  hence  epistemically  required  to  conciliate.    
The  reasoning  just  sketched  suggests  that,  although  metalinguistic  negotiation  can  
help  the  contextualist  to  explain  why  pure  moral  disagreements  are  genuine,  that  
very   explanation   of   genuineness   at   least   makes   the   contextualist’s   ability   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  On  Plunkett  and  Sundell’s  usage,  conceptual  ethics  involves  questions  like  “how  should  we  use  our  
words?”   as  well   as   questions   like   “which   concepts   should  we  use?”   (2013:   3;   see   also  Burgess   and  
Plunkett  2013a  and  2013b).  
19  The  contextualist  need  not  say  that  all  genuine  pure  moral  disagreements  are  disagreements   in  
conceptual  ethics;   she  could  allow   that,  while  many  genuine  pure  moral  disagreements  have   this  
character,  some  are  genuine  for  a  different  reason  or  in  a  different  way.  Perhaps,  for  instance,  some  
are  genuine  for  the  reason  that  we  have  noted  in  our  discussion  of  Dreier:  because,  in  those  cases,  
conversational  context  establishes  a  common  subject  matter  for  the  utterances  of  both  parties.    
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vindicate  Asymmetry  less  obvious.  We  cannot  argue  here  that  no  such  vindication  
is  possible.  However,  rather  than  falling  trivially  out  of  observations  about  talking  
past,  such  a  vindication  looks  like  a  highly  substantive  additional  explanatory  task.    
In  this  section,  we  again  cast  doubt  on  the  Simple  Diagnosis  of  Asymmetry.  We  
did   so   by   considering   two   ways   in   which   sophisticated   contextualists   might  
account   for   the  genuineness  of   pure  moral  disagreement.  We  argued   that  both  
strategies   prevent   sophisticated   contextualists   from   offering   a   simple   “talking-­‐
past”  explanation  for  Asymmetry.  To  be  clear,  not  every  contextualist  adopts  one  
of  the  two  strategies  discussed  in  this  section  in  order  to  explain  the  genuineness  
of  pure  moral  disagreement.  (For  two  other  leading  contextualist  approaches,  see  
Finlay  2014  and  Khoo  and  Knobe  2016;  for  a  survey,  see  Björnsson  2017,  especially  
282ff.)  In  light  of  this,  we  cannot  conclusively  show  that  the  problems  that  we  have  
noted  in  this  section  afflict  all  contextualist  attempts  to  straightforwardly  explain  
Asymmetry.  But  there  are  reasons  for  the  contextualist  to  be  pessimistic  on  this  
front.  Notably,  although  we  have  focused  on  the  importance  of  accounting  for  the  
genuineness   of   pure   moral   disagreement   in   this   section,   this   is   not   the   only  
important   desideratum   on   a   satisfactory   contextualist   view.   A   satisfactory  
contextualism   should   also   meet   the   desideratum   that   we   noted   for   anti-­‐
descriptivist   views   in   section  2:   it   should  allow   for   reasonable   judgments   about  
purely  moral  fallibility.  And  section  2  suggested  that  natural  ways  of  interpreting  
this   sort   of   judgment   will   undercut   the   Simple   Diagnosis   of   Asymmetry.   We  
conclude,   then,   that   the   path   from   contextualism   to   Asymmetry   is   far   from  
straightforward.  
  
4.   Virtue,  Rationality,  and  Asymmetry  
We  have  argued  that  plausible  versions  of  anti-­‐descriptivist  and  contextualist  anti-­‐
realism   cannot   vindicate   Asymmetry   in   the   way   envisioned   by   the   Simple  
Diagnosis:   even   in   the   absence   of   objective   moral   facts,   there   can   be   clear  
explanations   of   epistemic   pressure   toward   conciliation   on   moral   matters.   It   is  
worth  emphasizing  the  limitations  of  these  arguments:  they  debunked  simple  anti-­‐
realist   attempts   to   vindicate   Asymmetry.   They   are   compatible   with   the   more  
modest  hypothesis  that  –  while  things  are  much  more  complicated  than  the  Simple  
Diagnosis  suggests  –  the  anti-­‐realist  will  nonetheless  turn  out  to  be  better  placed  
to  explain  Asymmetry  than  the  realist.  In  this  section  we  cast  doubt  on  even  this  
modest  hypothesis.  We  make  a  provisional  case   for   the   idea   that  Asymmetry   is  
best  explained  by  moral  pressures  on  our  moral  beliefs.  We  do  not  take  a  stand  on  
precisely  how   this  moral   pressure  might  be   related   to   epistemic   rationality;  we  
simply  argue  that,  if  Asymmetry  is  best  explained  in  this  way,  there  is  no  reason  to  
think  that  it  favors  the  anti-­‐realist.20    
Return  to  the  example  that  we  used  to  initially  motivate  Asymmetry:  most  of  us  
are   aware   that   a   distressingly   vast   sea   of   humanity   takes   homosexuality   to   be  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20   Several   philosophers   have   offered   alternative   accounts   that   can   be   interpreted   as   vindicating  
something  like  Asymmetry:  see,  for  instance,  Elga  (2007),  Huemer  (2011,  29),  Sherman  (2014),  and  
Vavova  (2014).  We  cannot  address  these  alternatives  here,  but  note  that,  like  our  own  briefly  sketched  
proposal,  they  are  bad  news  for  the  idea  that  Asymmetry  is  evidence  of  metaethical  anti-­‐realism.    
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wrong.  Imagine  that,  in  light  of  this  disagreement,  you  suspend  judgment  about  
this  question.  Imagine  further  that  you  let  this  agnosticism  inform  your  attitudes,  
your   personal   relationships,   and   your   political   actions.   Set   aside   the   sort   of  
question  we  have  been  focusing  on  (would  it  be  epistemically  rational  to  suspend  
judgment  in  this  way?).  Instead,  ask:  would  this  suspension  of  judgment  be  morally  
good  or  bad?  This  latter  question  seems  much  easier  to  answer:  it  would  be  morally  
awful.21   More   generally,   it   often   seems   to   be   a   moral   vice   to   let   your   moral  
commitments  be  pushed  around  by  prevailing  beliefs.22  
One   could   attempt   to   deploy   this   insight   to   debunk   the   appeal   of   Asymmetry:  
roughly,  the  idea  would  be  that  in  thinking  about  cases  like  Homosexuality,  we  are  
somehow   mistaking   our  moral   judgment   that   steadfastness   is   virtuous   for   an  
epistemic  judgment  that  it  is  rational.23  While  we  cannot  rule  out  this  attempted  
debunking,   it   is   worth   emphasizing   two   reasons   why   it   is   unattractive.   First,  
successful  debunking  arguments  need  more  than  a  “just  so”  story  about  error,  such  
as   the   one   just   offered.   But   it   is   unclear  what   independent   reasons  we  have   to  
distrust  our  clear   judgments  about  cases   like  Homosexuality.  Second,  given   the  
ubiquity  of  such  cases,  the  conclusion  that  steadfastness  in  such  cases  is  morally  
virtuous  but  epistemically   irrational  suggests  a  deep  tension  between  our  moral  
and  epistemic  ideals  that  many  will  find  hard  to  swallow.    
Suppose,   then   that   one   rejects   this   unappealing   tension,   thereby   denying   that  
disagreements   in   cases   like   Homosexuality   require   us   to   sacrifice   either   our  
epistemic  rationality  or  our  moral  virtue.  Given  what  we  have  argued,  this  commits  
one  to  there  being  a  connection  between  the  morally  appropriate  response  to  a  
moral  disagreement  and  the  epistemically  rational  response  to  that  disagreement.  
We   suggest   that   a   related   commitment   arguably   underlies   central   parts   of   the  
literature  on  moral  testimony.  Opponents  of  legitimate  moral  testimony  insist  that  
we  should  regulate  our  moral  opinions  autonomously  (Wolff  1970),  or  that  we  are  
required  to  hold  moral  beliefs  solely  for  the  (moral)  reasons  that  make  them  true  
(Hopkins  2007),  or  that  moral  believers  should  aim  at  understanding  rather  than  
knowledge  or   truth   (Hills  2009).  Each  of   these   theses   is  more  straightforwardly  
motivated  as  a  view  about  morally  virtuous  cultivation  of  our  moral  beliefs  than  as  
an   epistemic   norm.   Their   epistemic   significance   is   most   easily   motivated   by  
combining   their  plausibility  as  moral   theses  with   the   implausibility  of   the  deep  
moral/epistemic  tension  mentioned  above.  Some  of  the  most  powerful  defenses  of  
the   epistemic   legitimacy   of  moral   testimony   can   be   read   in   the   same  way.   For  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Some  may  be  tempted  to  think  that  only  the  change  in  behavior  and  attitudes,  and  not  the  suspense  
of  judgment  itself,  is  morally  problematic  in  this  case.  Even  on  this  view,  however,  the  case  justifies  
investigation   into   connections   between   moral   virtue   and   epistemic   rationality.   An   agent   who  
becomes  agnostic  about  homosexuality  without  changing  her  behavior  or  attitudes  purchases  moral  
virtue   at   the   cost   of   internal   incoherence.   We   should,   if   possible,   avoid   the   conclusion   that  
disagreements   like   Homosexuality   force   us   to   sacrifice   either   virtue,   epistemic   rationality,   or  
coherence.	  
22  We  think  it  is  most  natural  to  describe  the  moral  complaint  here  in  terms  of  virtue  or  vice.  We  do  
not  intend  by  doing  so  to  commit  ourselves  to  a  view  of  morality  that  takes  virtue  to  be  the  central  
organizing  notion.    
23   See  Wedgwood   (2007,   255-­‐6)   and  Adams   (1999,   ch.   16)   for   reasons   to   think   that  morality  may  
sometimes  require  greater  certainty  than  rationality  allows.  
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example,  Karen  Jones  frames  her  defense  of  moral  testimony  (1999)  in  terms  of  the  
trust  that  mature  and  morally  virtuous  agents  will  place  in  some  moral  testimony.    
In  this  brief  paper,  we  do  not  attempt  to  prove  that  there  is  in  fact  a  connection  
between  morally  virtuous  and  epistemically   rational  moral   thinking.  Nor  do  we  
make  any  proposals  about  the  form  such  a  connection  might  take  or  about  the  best  
way  to  explain  it.  We  offer  only  a  conditional  conclusion:  if  the  correct  explanation  
of  Asymmetry  involves  an  appeal  to  the  moral  goodness  of  steadfastness  in  cases  
like  Homosexuality,   then  Asymmetry   does   not   favor   anti-­‐realism.  After   all,   the  
claim   that   steadfastness   is  morally  good   in   cases   like  Homosexuality   is   a  moral  
claim,  and  one  which  appears  straightforwardly  compatible  with  a  variety  of  both  
realist  and  anti-­‐realist  metaethical  views.  Notably,  there  is  no  obvious  reason  that  
an  anti-­‐descriptivist  or  a  contextualist  would  feel  any  pressure  to  accept  this  claim  
in  light  of  their  metaethical  commitments.  Combined  with  our  prior  arguments,  
this  suggests  that  there  is  little  left  to  be  said  for  the  view  that  Asymmetry  even  
prima  facie  favors  the  anti-­‐realist.  
  
5.   Conclusions  
This  paper  has  argued  that  the  plausibility  of  Asymmetry  does  not  favor  the  anti-­‐
realist.   Our   foil   was   the   Simple   Diagnosis:   that   Asymmetry   can   be   explained  
because   moral   disagreement   does   not   provide   evidence   of   our   possible  
unreliability  concerning  objective  moral  facts.  In  §2-­‐3,  we  argued  that  the  Simple  
Diagnosis   is   too   simple:   it   is   compatible   only   with   otherwise   implausible   anti-­‐
realist  views.  Once  such  views  were  modified  to  explain  other  crucial  phenomena,  
they   failed   to  provide  a  clear  explanation  of  Asymmetry.   In   the   last   section,  we  
pushed   further,   arguing   that   the   most   promising   framework   for   explaining  
Asymmetry  –  which  appealed  to  considerations  about  how  the  morally  virtuous  
agent  would  respond  to  disagreement  –  also  suggests   that   there   is  no  reason  to  
think  that  the  best  explanation  of  Asymmetry  will  ultimately  favor  the  metaethical  
anti-­‐realist.    
It   would   be   a   mistake,   however,   to   infer   that   Asymmetry   has   no   metaethical  
implications.   To   see   this,   suppose   both   that   Asymmetry   is   true,   and   that   the  
connection  between  moral  virtue  and  epistemic  rationality  that  we  motivated  in  
§4  is  at  the  heart  of  the  correct  explanation  of  Asymmetry.  There  is  every  reason  
to   think   that   explaining   the   relevant   connection   between   moral   virtue   and  
epistemic   rationality   will   require   significant   metaethical   (and/or  
metaepistemological)   theorizing.   This   theorizing   will   have   to   look   beyond   the  
question  of  whether  moral   realism  or  moral   anti-­‐realism   is   true;   it  will  need   to  
address  a  host  of  questions  about   the   relationships  between  different  classes  of  
normative  judgments  and/or  facts.  If  epistemic  obligations  are  in  some  way  shaped  
or  constrained  by  moral  considerations,  in  virtue  of  what  do  moral  considerations  
provide  these  constraints?  Do  other  flavors  of  normativity—such  as,  for  instance,  
all-­‐things-­‐considered  norms  on  action—place  similar  constraints  on  epistemology?  
The   argument   of   this   paper  motivates   inquiry   into   these   sorts   of   fundamental  
inter-­‐normative  questions.    
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